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ERISA's CASUALTIES: FORMER EMPLOYEES DUPED INTO
EARLY RETIREMENT-WITH FRIENDS LIKE ERISA WHO
NEEDS ENEMIES?
INTRODUCTION

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")
is a federal statutory scheme that regulates most voluntary group pension
and health plans in private industry.2 One of the main purposes of
ERISA is to "promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries
in employment benefit plans ' 3 and protect against private sector mismanagement of employee benefit plans.4
However, ERISA provides only limited remedies compared to previously available state law remedies.5 Essentially, ERISA permits the
recovery of benefits and possible attorney fees, but does not allow for
extra contractual or punitive damages, and precludes a trial by jury. 6 As
construed, this comprehensive scheme, enacted for the benefit of employees, has turned out to shield employers and insurers more than those
it was designed to protect.7 In one commentator's opinion, Congress
must have been "asleep at the switch" when it stated that "ERISA's predominant purpose is to be the protection of the rights of beneficiaries of
medical and retirement
plans while simultaneously eliminating tradi8
tional remedies.",
This article discusses the split among eight circuits as to the treatment of a particular class of ERISA claimants who sometimes lack even
the limited remedies available under ERISA - former employees who
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
2.
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Health Plans & Benefits, Employee Retirement Income Security Act
- ERISA, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/erisa.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2006); ERISA
covers both employee pension plans and employee welfare plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l)-(3) (2000).
3.
Ryan W. Greene, The Evolving Standardfor ERISA Preemption of State Law Under
Recent United States Supreme Court Precedent, FIND LAW,
July 1,
1999,
http://library.findlaw.com/1999/JulI/126249.html. More than 85% of American workers have
private health insurance plans that are affected by ERISA. Id.
4. Id. (noting that in 1963 when the Studebaker Automotive plant closed its doors, it left
over 10,000 employees without pension benefits because the plan was inadequately funded).
5. Hon. William M. Acker, Jr., Can the Courts Rescue ERISA?, 29 CUMB. L. REv. 285,287,
295 (1998) (noting that extra-contractual damages and jury trials are unavailable under ERISA); see
Drinkwater v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821, 825 (1st Cir. 1988); Blake v. Unionmutual Stock
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 906 F.2d 1525, 1526 (1 th Cir. 1990).
6. Acker, supra note 5, at 295 (noting that since Congress did not mention whether disputes
were to be resolved by a jury or judge, this left the courts to decide whether jury trials are appropriate in ERISA actions, the courts have determined that they are not available); see, e.g., Adams v.
Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1158 (10th Cir. 1998).
7.
Acker, supra note 5, at 287 (noting that the "real beneficiaries of ERISA, if any, turn out
to be the fiduciaries, the administrators, the employers and the insurers.").
8.
Id. at 295.
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claim that their termination was fraudulently induced to deprive them of
more valuable benefits than had they remained employed. Five circuits
avoid the prospect of a remediless wrong by allowing the "but for" test
for standing under ERISA, 9 while the other three preclude defrauded
retirees from seeking redress based on claims of fraudulent inducement
into early retirement with inferior benefits.'l
Part I of this article offers a general background as to the purpose of
ERISA and an interpretation of its two forms of preemption: conflict and
complete. Part II discusses the split among the circuits as to the issue of
standing for former employees to sue under ERISA, and how the Tenth
Circuit has sided in its recent decision of Felix v. Lucent Technologies,
Inc. 1" Part III addresses the Tenth Circuit's Felix decision and its reasoning for siding with the minority view. Part IV addresses the lack of
remedies for former employees and suggests what Congress and the Supreme Court might do to make ERISA more true to its original purpose.
This article concludes by underscoring the particular unfairness to former
employees and no doubt unintended benefits to employers who mistreat
their workers.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
"Congress enacted ERISA to 'protect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries' by setting out
substantive regulatory requirements for employee benefit plans and 'to
provide for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.""' 12 The central purpose of ERISA is to provide a "uniform13
regulatory" scheme covering employee pension and welfare plans.
Toward that end, ERISA includes expansive conflict preemption provisions "to ensure that employee benefit plan regulation would be 'exclusively a federal concern.""' 14 As construed, ERISA provides the sole
remedy for those with standing to sue under it.' 5 ERISA involves two
preemption provisions' 6 and the distinction between the concept of com9.
Felix v. Lucent Tech. Inc., 387 F.3d 1146, 1159 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits allow former employees to gain standing to sue under ERISA
while using a "but for" test for standing); see also Adamson v. Armco Inc., 44 F.3d 650, 654-55 (8th
Cir. 1995); Swinney v. Gen. Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 518-19 (6th Cir. 1995); Mullins v. Pfizer,
Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1994); Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 702-03 (1st Cir.
1994); Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1220-21 (5th Cir. 1992).
10. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1159; see also Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp., 983 F.2d 1528, 1535 (10th
Cir. 1993); Sanson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 618, 619 (11th Cir. 1992); Mitchell v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 896 F.2d 463, 466 (10th Cir. 1990); Santon v. Gulf Oil Corp., 792 F.2d 432, 433 (4th Cir.
1986).
11.
387 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2005).
12.
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)
(2000)).
13.
Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 208.
14. Id. (citing Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981)).
15.
Id. at 208-209.
16.
Felix v. Lucent Tech. Inc., 387 F.3d 1146, 1153-54 (10 t ' Cir. 2004).
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plete preemption under Section 502(a) and Section 514's "conflict preemption" is critical
to understanding courts' application of the preemp17
tion doctrine.
Judicial construction of available remedies has resulted in very limited remedies for claims subject to ERISA. While many courts have
recognized this injustice, they profess helplessness to do anything about
it. 18 Contrary to ERISA's original purpose, it has become an "impenetrable shield[] that insulate[s] plan sponsors from any meaningful liability for negligent or malfeasant acts committed against plan beneficiaries." 19 Ironically, the courts that interpret this statute are exempt from
ERISA.2 °
Judges have been decrying the restriction of available remedies and
lack of deterrents to misbehaving insurers and employers, but they do no
more than appeal to Congress to restrain the law.2' In the Ninth Circuit's
Olson v. General Dynamics Corp.,22 Judge Reinhardt, recognizing that
ERISA preempted plaintiffs state law claims, found the plaintiffs lack
of a federal or state remedy unfortunate.2 3 Judge Reinhardt noted that
prior to the passage of ERISA, the plaintiff would have been entitled to
state remedies for his fraud and misrepresentation claims; unfortunately,
his lack of remedy is not unique. 24
More recently, in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila,2 5 the United States
Supreme Court held that the respondent's state claims fell within the
scope of Section 502(a) of ERISA, and therefore were completely preempted, justifying removal to federal court.26 Justice Ginsburg notes with
concern that "virtually all state remedies are preempted," and since very
few federal remedies are available, a "regulatory vacuum exists. 27
However, Congress has taken no action.

17.
Id.
18.
See Olson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 960 F.2d 1418, 1423-25 (9th Cir. 1991) (Reinhardt,
J., concurring); Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 222 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
19.
Difelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring).
20.
"The provisions of this [title] [ERISA] shall not apply to any employee benefit plan if...
a governmental plan ... or a church plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(l)-(2) (2000); see 29 U.S.C. §
1002(32)-(33) (2000).
21.
See Sanson 966 F.2d at 623 (Birch, J., dissenting); Difelice, 346 F.3d at 452; Aetna
Health, 542 U.S. at 222.
22.
960 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991).
23.
Olson, 960 F.2d at 1423.
24. Id.
25.
542 U.S. 200 (2004).
26. Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 222.
27. Id
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A. Section 51428 Conflict Preemption Under ERISA
Section 514 provides in pertinent part that ERISA "shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan covered by ERISA.,, 29 A State law relates to 'an
a plan 30
ERISA plan "if it has a connection with or reference to such
and is therefore preempted unless it falls within an exception of Section
514. 3 1 This broadly-worded provision has been repeatedly observed as
"clearly expansive" by the Supreme Court,32 stretching and contracting
like a rubber band. 33 However, the Court has also simultaneously recognized that the "term 'relate to' cannot be . . . 'extend[ed] to the furthest
stretch of its indeterminacy' or else 'for all practical purposes preemption
will never run its course.', 34 Essentially, preemption means "that once
state remedies are eliminated, ERISA35provides the only remedy, which is
either a pallid remedy or no remedy.,
Judge Becker of the Third Circuit has taken notice of the mischief
that ERISA's broad preemption brings, noting that:
Lower courts have struggled to maintain some semblance of equity
notwithstanding the enormous breadth of the preemption test.., the
price of all this has been descent into a Serbonian bog wherein judges
are forced to don logical blinders36 and split the linguistic atom to decide even the most routine cases.
ERISA remedies pale in comparison to state law claims that are now
preempted for relating to a plan. 37 Courts, in determining whether a
State law is related to ERISA, and is thus preempted, look to the objectives of ERISA and the nature and effect the state law has on the ERISA
plans.38
This type of federal preemption under Section 514 is a defense and
cannot by itself establish federal question jurisdiction. Thus, it is not
sufficient to authorize removal to the federal court system.39 On the other
28.
29.

29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 141 (2001).

30. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)).
Some courts have recognized an exception to Section 514 ERISA conflict preemption
31.
occurs when the "state law has only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral connection with covered plans,
as is the case with many laws of general applicability." Felix, 387 F.3d at 1154.
32. Id. at 1153.
Acker, supra note 5, at 289 (noting that "[a] survey of cases indicates that the words
33.
'relate to' stretch and contract like a rubber band").
34.

Felix, 387 F.3d at 1153 (citing Eglehoff, 532 U.S. at 146).

Acker, supra note 5, at 287 (calling ERISA preemption "super duper preemption" because
35.
ERISA affords plaintiffs either pallid remedies or no remedies).
36. Difelice, 346 F.3d at 454. "A Serbonian bog is a mess from which there is no way of
extricating oneself." Id. at 454 n. 1.
37.
Jayne E. Zanglein, Closing the Gap: Safeguarding Participants'Rightsby Expanding the
FederalCommon Law ofERISA, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 671, 671 (1994).

38.
39.

Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147.
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987).
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hand, Section 502(a), 40 as discussed below, provides a civil enforcement
cause of action that completely preempts a state cause of action seeking
the same relief.41 Thus, a claim falling within the scope of 502(a) presents a federal question providing grounds for removal.42 If the plaintiff
moves to remand, the defendant will only need to show a substantial
federal claim.43
B. Section 502(a) Complete Preemption under ERISA
The preemptive reach of ERISA's civil enforcement provision, Section 502(a), is powerful. 44 When state laws are preempted under Section
514, remedies may be available under Section 502(a). 45 ERISA provides
a federal cause of action under Section 502(a) which contains six subsections that determine who can bring a civil action. 6 In Metropolitan Life
v. Taylor,47 the Court held that ERISA Section 502(a) converts state
causes of action into federal claims "for the purposes of determining the
propriety of removal. 4 8 ERISA's civil enforcement mechanism has
"extraordinary preemptive power" that "converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim as an exception to the
well-pleaded complaint rule. ' 49 Claims falling within the scope of
ERISA Section 502(a) are thus removable to federal court.5 °
Defendants (employers, administrators, or fiduciaries) want ERISA
to govern the claims against them because of ERISA's severely limited
or absent remedies. 51 However, the plaintiff-employee would rather proceed under a state law theory that "provides what ERISA was supposed
to provide. 52 When complete preemption does not apply, federal district
40.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).
41.
Giles v. Nylcare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999). Section 502(a)
provides a cause of action to any plan beneficiary or participant to recover benefits due under the
terms of the pension plan, to enforce rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).
42.
Giles, 172 F.3d at 337. The Court further expanded the doctrine of complete preemption
in Aetna Health Inc., v. Davila,stating "where no legal duty (state or federal) independent of ERISA
or the plan terms is violated, then the suit falls 'within the scope of' ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)... then
the individual's cause of action is completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)." Felix, 387 F.3d
at 1155 (citing Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004)).
43.
Giles, 172 F.3d at 337.
44.
Section 502(a) provides a cause of action to any plan beneficiary or participant to recover
benefits due under the terms of the pension plan, to enforce rights under the terms of the plan, or to
clarify rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).
45.
Remedies available under ERISA are liquidated damages, benefits owed to the participant
under the terms of the plan, enforcement of rights under the plan, to clarify future benefits, equitable
relief, and to enforce provisions of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
46.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
47.
481 U.S. 58 (1987).
48.
Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 201; see also Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557,
560 (1968).
49. Aetna Health, 542 U.S. at 209 (quoting Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 65-66).
50.
Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 66; Giles, 172 F.3d at 337.
51.
Acker, supranote 5, at 287.
52.
Id.
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courts are without removal jurisdiction. 3 Therefore, they cannot resolve
any dispute regarding conflict preemption, and must remand to state
court, where the preemption issue can be determined. 54 It is likely the
court will dismiss state law claims under Section 514. In a diversity action, the federal court could determine that there was no complete preemption under Section 502(a), and then also dismiss state law claims as
preempted by Section 514.

II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON FORMER EMPLOYEE ERISA STANDING
The split among the circuits appears to rest principally upon their
interpretations of the Supreme Court's discussion of who is a "participant" with standing to sue under ERISA in FirestoneTire & Rubber Co.
v. Birch.56 A plaintiff must be within the statutory definition of "participant" to fall within the scope of Section 502(a)(1) - (3), in order to bring
a suit under ERISA.57 Former employees must qualify as participants to
file suit for fraudulent inducement into early retirement, in hopes of restoring the benefits they would have been entitled to.58 In Firestone,the
Court observed that a former employee can only gain participant standing if they have a "reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment or who have a colorable claim to vested benefits ....
"59
The majority of circuits have interpreted Firestone broadly, not as
60
the only way for a plaintiff to have standing to sue, but as one avenue.
Looking at congressional intent and the original purposes of ERISA, the
majority of circuits feel that a grave injustice would be served if Firestone were narrowly interpreted as the only way a plaintiff could be a
participant. 61 In contrast, the minority circuits narrowly interpret Firestone to hold that participant status is both a question of subject matter
jurisdiction and standing, finding that Section 502 gives the court jurisdiction62 only if plaintiffs standing as participant is as defined in Firestone.

53. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1158.
54. Id.;
see also Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 63 (noting that a state cause of action that is preempted by ERISA and within the scope of 502(a) of ERISA might fall within the Avco rule); Warner
v. Ford Motor Co., 46 F.3d 531, 534 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that Section 514 does not create a
federal cause of action itself); Giles, 172 F.3d at 336 (holding that state claims that are not within the
scope of 502(a), even if preempted are not removable).
55.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
56. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
57. See Firestone,489 U.S. at 117-18; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)-(6) (2000).
58. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1158.
59. Firestone,489 U.S. at 117 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Saladino v. I.L.G.W.U. Nat'l
Ret. Fund, 754 F.2d 473, 476 (2d Cir. 1985)).
60. See, e.g., Swinney v. Gen. Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 518 (6th Cir. 1995).
61.
See Swinney, 46 F.3d at 518; Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1221 (5th
Cir. 1992).
62.
See Felix, 387 F.3d at 1160 n. 14 (holding that the "requirement of [section] 502 is 'both a

standing and a subject matter jurisdictional requirement."') (citing Santon v. Gulf Oil Corp., 792
F.2d 432,434 (4th Cir. 1986)); see also Miller v. Rite Aid Corp., 334 F.3d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 2003).
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. As former employees who are voluntarily terminated from their
employment based on their employer's and plan administrator's misrepresentations, they cannot achieve participant standing under ERISA to
file a claim.63 Since the plaintiffs are no longer employees, they cannot
recover for benefits owed to them or enforce their rights under the plan,
nor do they have any right to future benefits. 64 Therefore, to recover
benefits that they would have received had they not been fraudulently
induced into retirement, they must achieve participant status via another
avenue.65 A "but for" test for standing has been accepted by the majority
of circuits.66 This test is based upon the theory that "but for" the defendant's wrongful actions, the plaintiffs would have still been participants
under the plan.67 However, circuits are split over whether plaintiffs have
standing
to bring a cause of action under ERISA by making a "but for"
68
claim.
A. The Majority View: FraudConfers "But For" Test for Standing Under ERISA
Five circuits now permit former employees to sue under ERISA, if
plaintiffs can make a "but for" claim for standing through allegations of
premature termination of employment induced by employer fraud.69
In Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp. ,70 the plaintiff was unable to
achieve standing to sue because he could not show a colorable claim for
vested benefits or a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment. 7' The Fifth Circuit felt that Firestone could not "reduce the
72
standing question to a straightforward formula applicable in all cases."
It added, "[this] seems particularly so in cases involving allegations of
discharge. 73 Rather, the court observed, "it would seem more logical to
say that but for the employer's conduct alleged to be in violation of
ERISA, the employee would be a current employee with a reasonable
",74
expectation of receiving benefits ....

63. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1159.
64. Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Id.(noting the Fourth, Eleventh, and Tenth Circuits are in the minority and have rejected
the "but for" exception in determining participant standing).
69. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1159 (noting that the "First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eight Circuits
have held that former employees may sue under ERISA if they make a 'but for' claim of this sort").
70.
950 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir. 1992) (dealing with the issue of former employees who claimed
deprivation of benefits through fraudulent inducement to retire).
71.
Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1221 (5th Cir. 1992); see Firestone, 489
U.S. at 101.
72.
Christopher,950 F.2d at 1221.
73.
Id.
74. Id.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:3

75
In Vartanian v. Monsanto Co.,
the First Circuit held that former
employees have standing to sue under ERISA if they can show that "but
for" their employer's wrongful conduct, they would have been a participant for purposes of standing. 76 The Vartanian court held that an employee who was denied a reasonable opportunity to make an informed
decision about when to retire, as a result of his supervisor's misrepresentations and the fact that he received benefits, could not "be used to deprive him of 'participant' status ....,,7Determining that the former employee had standing to sue under ERISA, the First Circuit notes that the
Supreme Court's discussion of Firestone states that the "term 'participant' was developed outside of the 'standing' context and therefore, does
not mandate a finding" that one who is not a78 participant because no
longer employed, has no standing to seek relief.

Examining the legislative history of ERISA, the Vartanian court
noted Congress' intent that the federal courts would "construe the Act's
jurisdictional requirements broadly in order to facilitate enforcement of
its remedial provisions . . . . ,,79 To find that the plaintiff lacked standing
to sue under ERISA would "frustrate Congress's intention to remove
jurisdictional and procedural obstacles to such claims," and deprive an
employee of standing "even where the employer's breach of fiduciary
duty takes the form of misrepresentations that induced the employee to
retire and receive the payment of benefits. 80
The Second Circuit, in Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc. 81 following the view
of the First and Fifth Circuits, adopted this same exception in the case of
former employees.82 The court held that it was "more consistent with
legislative intent to afford standing in the present context[,]" and furthermore, that to "hold otherwise would have the anomalous effect of
allowing a fiduciary83 'through its own malfeasance to defeat the employee' s standing."

75.
14 F.3d 697 (1st Cir. 1994).
76.
Vartanian, 14 F.3d at 702.
77.
Id. at 703.
78.
Id.at 701 (citing Christopher, 950 F.2d at 1221 ("Firestone... [cannot] be read to reduce
the standing question to a straightforward formula applicable in all cases.")).
79.
Id. at 702 (noting that "[t]he enforcement provisions have been designed specifically to
provide ... participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for redressing or preventing violations of the [Act].") (citing S. REP. No. 93-127, at 3 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639,4871).
80.
Id. (noting that a holding like this "would enable an employer to defeat the employee's
rights to sue for a breach of fiduciary duty by keeping his breach a well guarded secret until the

employee receives his benefits or, by distributing a lump sum .. .before the employee can file
suit.").
81.

23 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1994).

82.
Mullins, 23 F.3d at 668. The former employee in Mullins voluntarily retired because of
material misrepresentations by his plan administrator. Id. at 665.
83.
Id.at 668 (agreeing with the First Circuit in its determination that the "basic standing
issue is whether the plaintiff is 'within the zone of interests ERISA was intended to protect[]"').
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The Eighth Circuit joined the majority view in Adamson v. Armco,
Inc.8 4 The Eighth Circuit recognized the plaintiffs standing when "'but
the emfor the employer's conduct alleged to be in violation of ERISA,'
85
ployee or former employee would be a plan participant.,
In Swinney v. General Motors, Corp.,86 the Sixth Circuit held that
"so long as a former employee would have been in a class eligible to
become a member of the plan but for the fiduciary's alleged breach of
duty, he 'may become eligible' for benefits under the plan and is therefore a 'participant'

. .

. for the purposes of standing. 87

Acknowledging the Tenth and Fourth Circuit holdings that a "person who terminates his right to belong to a plan cannot be a 'participant'
in the plan, 8 8 the Swinney court adhered to the proposition that ERISA
was not intended to allow a "fiduciary to circumvent his ERISA-imposed
fiduciary duty in this manner., 8 9 The Swinney court also found that in
rejecting the "but for" tests for standing, the minority courts interpret the
Supreme Court's Firestone decision "too strictly," 90 observing that while
Firestone, although it provides guidance, "is not necessarily dispositive." 9 '
B. The Minority View Rejects "But For" Testfor Standing
The Tenth Circuit is illustrative of the minority view, rejecting the
"but for" claim and requiring former employees to have either an expectation of returning to covered employment, or a "colorable claim to
vested benefits" to achieve participant status under the statute.92 The
Tenth Circuit's reasoning in its earlier decisions of Mitchell v. Mobil Oil
Corp.93 and Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp.94 foretold its rejection of the
"but for" exception. The court found the early retiree in Mitchell without
participant standing under ERISA Section 502(a), reversing the jury's
finding of fraud and damages awarded. 95 The court held that the definition of "participant" does not include former employees who received a

84. 44 F.3d 650, 654-55 (8th Cir. 1995) (adopting this exception in Howe v. Varity Corp., 36
F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 1994)).
85. Adamson, 44 F.3d at 654.
86. 46 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 1995).
87. Swinney, 46 F.3d at 519.
88. Id. at 518 (recognizing that without this exception a "fiduciary could defeat an employee's
standing to bring an ERISA action by duping him into giving up his right to participate in the plan").
89. Id. at 519.
90. Id. (reemphasizing that Firestoneshould not be interpreted to "reduce the standing question to a straightforward formula").
91.
Id. at 518.
92. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1159.
93.
896 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1990).
94.
983 F.2d 1528 (10th Cir. 1993).
95. Mitchell, 896 F.2d at 474. The Tenth Circuit set aside a jury verdict of "$405,962.76 in
back-pay damages; $86,000 as compensation for the 20% reduction in Mr. Mitchell's lump-sum
benefit; and, $96,740.82 in front-pay damages." Id. at 466.
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lump-sum payment
of all that had vested at the time they left covered
96
employment.
While Mitchell did not specifically reject a "but for" test, it rejected
a very similar argument--"'that Mobil's violation of ERISA entitled
[him] to additional benefits which he would have received had Mobil's
[misrepresentations regarding the] amendments to the Plan not compelled him to retire [early]."' 97 The Mitchell court determined that, notwithstanding the fraudulent conduct of the defendant, the plaintiff lacked
standing to sue under ERISA because he did not have a colorable claim
to vested benefits, and had neither sought reinstatement nor had expectations of returning to covered employment. 98
Following Mitchell, the Raymond court determined that Raymond
had no claim for vested benefits because he had received all plan benefits
to which he was entitled at the time of retirement. Therefore, Raymond
lacked standing to sue under ERISA, regardless of the wrongdoings of
his employer. 99 In its holding, the court stated, "'[tfo say that but for
Mobil's conduct, plaintiffs would have standing is to admit that they lack
standing and to allow those who merely claim to be participants to be
deemed as such."' 100
In the Eleventh Circuit's Sanson v. General Motors Corp.,10 1 the
plaintiff argued that "but for" GM's fraudulent misrepresentations, he
would have continued his employment and therefore should be considered a participant with standing to sue under ERISA.10 2 The Sanson
court held that the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations related to Sanson's retirement benefits available under GM's plan, and therefore were
preempted under Section 514.103 Because the plaintiff did not satisfy
ERISA's definition of participant, he had no claim under
it either, re1 4
gardless of whether or not a remedy would be available.
In Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp.,1°5 the Fourth Circuit, in its rejection of
the "but for" exception, held that the effect of allowing a "but for" test
would be to "impose participant status on every single employee who but
for some future contingency may become eligible."' 0 6 The court noted
96.
97.

Id at 474.
Felix, 387 F.3d at 1160 n.13 (quoting Mitchell, 896 F.2d at 474).

98.

Id.

99. See Raymond, 983 F.2d at 1531, 1533.
100.
Felix, 387 F.3d at 1160 (quoting Raymond, 983 F.2d at 1536).
101. 966 F.2d 618 (1lth Cir. 1992).
102. Sanson, 966 F.2d at 619.
103. Id.at 621.
104. Id. (relying on a restrictive interpretation of 502(a)). In PilotLife, the Court stated that an
inadequate remedy under ERISA is an insufficient reason to overcome the express language of the
statute. Id. at 622.

105.
792 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1986).
106. Stanton, 792 F.2d at 435 (stating that "[n]either caselaw nor other provision of ERISA
supports such a reading of 'participant[].').
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that neither case law nor ERISA supported such an interpretation of "participant," holding that the protections of ERISA are tied to current participants only.' 07
In rejecting a "but for" test for standing, the minority circuits leave
plaintiffs without a remedy at both the state and federal level. 10 8 Lacking
participant status, plaintiffs will not be permitted to bring an ERISA
claim, and at the same time, will find their state law claims preempted
because they are "related to" their plan.
III. ERISA, COMPLETE PREEMPTION, AND FELIX V. LUCENT
TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 09
'
In Felix v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., the Tenth Circuit unquestionably rejected the concept of a "but for" test for standing that allows
former employees to file suit under ERISA as participants. As discussed
below, this decision may leave former employees without a remedy in
either state or federal court.
A. Facts
Plaintiff Aaron Felix worked for Lucent Technologies' Oklahoma
City Works ("OKCW") manufacturing facility." 0 Lucent decided to sell
its manufacturing facilities, including OKCW, or merge them with similar companies."' On February 19, 2001, Lucent offered, pursuant to a
memorandum agreement with The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("IBEW"), a new benefits package to its retirement-eligible
employees who elected to retire early-a payment equal to 110% of their
termination allowance, plus a "special pension benefit" of $11,000.112
For those employees who were not retirement-eligible, Lucent offered to
"provide a transactional leave of absence by adding five years to the age
and/or service to make the employee pension-eligible .... ,113 Any employees who wished to accept this offer had to do so by May 29, 2001,
and leave employment on June 30, 2001.14 On several occasions, Lucent representatives stated that this offer was a "one-time, non-

107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Raymond, 983 F.2d at 1531, 1533; Sanson, 966 F.2d at 621; Mitchell, 896 F.2d
at 474; Stanton, 792 F.2d at 435.
109. 387 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2005).
110. Felix, 387 F.3dat 1151-52.
111.

Id. at 1151.

112. Id. (desiring to make OKCW more attractive to prospective buyers or merging companies,
Lucent decided to reduce the number of its long-term employees; $11,000 represents the amount the
employee was entitled to under a pending National Labor Relations Board award against Lucent).
113. Id.
114.
Id. Lucent distributed written material and held many meetings at OKCW during which
Lucent representatives outlined the benefits being offered. Id.
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negotiable, final offer that was a take-it-or-leave it proposal" and that
there would be no additional offers of any additional benefits. 15
In reliance upon the representations that this was a "take-it-or-leaveit" one-time offer and that delaying retirement "would not gain the employee[s] additional benefits" in the future, Felix and over one thousand
other eligible employees accepted the offer and retired effective June 30,
2001.1 16 Subsequently, Celestica, Inc. agreed to take over the operations
of OKCW and hire its remaining employees on November 30, 2001.
Contrary to the representations Lucent had made prior to May 29, 2001,
Lucent offered a new benefits package to retirement eligible employees
on October 1, 2001.117 This package was identical to the previous offer
with one exception: it contained an additional payment of a "special onetime pension benefit" of $15,000."
Plaintiffs brought a class action suit in state court for fraud claming
that they relied on Lucent's intentional misrepresentations that encouraged Plaintiffs to retire early and accept the lower benefits package. 19 In
making the decision to retire early, they had no opportunity to discover
the truth regarding the misrepresentations until after they had received
their vested benefits. 2 ° The Plaintiffs requested damages for the additional $15,000 benefit that was later offered to retirement-eligible employees and the value of an additional year 2of service that was lost by
accepting June 30,2001 as a retirement date.' '
Lucent removed the case to federal court under the complete preemption doctrine of Section 502 of ERISA 122 and moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.1 23 Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand, asserting
lack of complete preemption and, therefore, lack of federal question subject matter jurisdiction. 2 4 Plaintiffs, only seeking damages for state law
fraud and not seeking an ERISA remedy, appealed.12 5

115. Id. This was reiterated in a newsletter distributed by IBEW on Mar. 21, 2001, in which the
union president flatly stated, "1 assure you there will not be any additional incentives for retirement."
Id. at1152.
116. Id.at1152.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1150, 1152.

121. Id.at 1152. (alleging that a "significant number of plaintiffs with a short time to their
respective anniversary dates lost an additional year of service by accepting the June 30th retirement
date." Arguing each year was worth approximately $4,000 in the "special pension payment plus a
reduction in the amount of the respective pension over the life of each pension"). Id. at 1152 n.3.
122.
Id. at 1150 (removing based on both ERISA and the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA")).
123.
Id.
124. Id.at 1152.
125. Id.at 1150 (appealing only the motion to dismiss not the motion to remand).
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B. Tenth Circuit'sAnalysis
The appeal focused on the issue of whether the Plaintiffs' state law
claims fell within the scope of Section 502(a) 26and were therefore completely preempted, thereby justifying removal.1
To exercise proper removal jurisdiction under Section 502 of
ERISA, it must be determined that the Plaintiffs have standing as a "participant or beneficiary" under the terms of their plan, in order to enforce
their rights under the plan. 127 ERISA defines participant in pertinent part
as: "[A]ny employee or former employee of an employer, or any member
or former member of an employee organization, who is or may become
eligible to receive a benefit of any type from
an employee benefit plan
28
which covers employees of such employer.'
Interpreting this definition in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch,129 the Supreme Court held that a former employee participant
must show a "colorable claim to vested benefits" or an expectation to
return to covered employment and fulfill eligibility requirements. 3 ° The
Court defined "'colorable claim' to vested benefits" as including situations where: (1) the plaintiff will "prevail in a suit for benefits," or (2)
fulfill eligibility requirements in the future.131
The Felix plaintiffs did not contend that they were entitled to additional benefits under their plan.' 32 They argued instead that they were
"fraudulently induced to take early retirement," and sought money damages from their former employer (the difference in benefits received and
those that would have been received had they not been duped into retiring when they did).' 33 The Felix court held that because Plaintiffs were
not claiming that they were (or were likely to become) eligible for additional benefits under the terms of their plan, or that vested benefits were
improperly withheld, but rather asked for damages based on their employer's fraud, their state law fraud claims did not fall within Section
502(a). 1 4 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit panel held that under the wellpleaded complaint doctrine, preemption under Section 514,135a defense to
Plaintiffs' state law claims, alone will not support removal.

126. Id.
127. Id.(defining beneficiary as a "person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an
employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder"); see 29 U.S.C. §
1002(8) (2000)).
128. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (2000).
129. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
130. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1159; see Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp., 983 F.2d 1528, 1533 (10th Cir.
1993).
131.
Firestone,489 U.S. at 117-18.
132. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1159.
133. Id.
134. Id.at 1162-63.
135. Id.at 1158.
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In sum, the Court found that the Felix Plaintiffs lacked a "colorable
claim for vested benefits,"'' 36 and had no reasonable expectation for returning to covered employment, because they did not seek reinstatement
either by contractual right or theory. 137
C. The Tenth Circuit'sRejection of the "But For" Test for Standing
Under ERISA Leaves Open Uncomfortable Possibilities
Ironically, the Tenth Circuit's rejection of Lucent's argument of
complete preemption' 38 was to Lucent's benefit.' 39 The Tenth Circuit
criticized the "but for" circuits as "mistakenly assum[ing] that [removal]
jurisdiction depends only on the traditional notion of 'standing,"' holding
that the ability to sue under Section 502(a)' 4involved
"both standing and a
0
subject matter jurisdictional requirement."'
The court also relied on its prior holdings in Mitchell v. Mobil Oil
Corp.,l41 Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp.,l42 and Boren v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co., Inc. 143 Like those cases, the Felix plaintiffs received all
plan benefits to which they were entitled at the time of their retirement
and, therefore, had no "'colorable claim' that additional benefits had
'vested' or 'will vest." ' 144 The court pointed out that in Raymond, it held
that the "receipt of the full extent of [plaintiffs'] vested benefits' was a
crucial fact."' 145 Absent a claim for benefits, Plaintiffs are merely seeking
damages based on their fraud and misrepresentation claims, not "vested
benefits improperly withheld."' 146 To allow this "but for" test for ERISA
standing, the court reasoned, would be tantamount to allowing those who
"merely claim to be participants to be deemed as such."' 14 7 Having re136.
Id; see Raymond, 983 F.2d at 1536.
137. Felix,387 F.3d at 1162.
138. Id. at 1159-61 ("but for [Lucent's] wrongful actions, [Plaintiffs] would have been entitled
to the additional benefits under the plan")
139.
Id. at 1159.
140. Id.at 1160 (noting the "'express grant of federal jurisdiction in ERISA is limited to suits
brought by certain parties outlined in § 502"') (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 21 (1983)).
141.
Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1990).
142.
Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp., 983 F.2d 1528 (10th Cir. 1993).
143. Boren v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., Inc., 933 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1991); Felix,
387 F.3d at 1159.
144.
Felix, 387 F.3d at 1160.
145.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
146. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (rejecting a "but for" test for ERISA standing when
noting there is no controlling case law or statutory language that supports a "but for" exception "to
find ERISA standing where plaintiff is not technically entitled to additional benefits under the pension plan").
147.
Id. Additionally, the court observed that its holdings in Mitchell and Raymond were consistent with its prior decision in Boren, 933 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding improperly withheld
vested benefits.) Following Raymond the court held that the plaintiff in Alexander v. AnheuserBusch Cos. a former employee, who did not have a reasonable expectation of returning to his employment, would only have standing only if he could show a "colorable claim for vested benefits."
Felix, 387 F.3d at 1160. Because the plaintiff's pre-existing medical condition was plainly excluded
by his plan, he could not show that he had a colorable claim and, therefore, lacked standing to sue
under ERISA. Id.(citing Alexander, 990 F.2d at 539 (10th Cir. 1993)).
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jected this argument in both Mitchell and Raymond, the court refused it
again. 148 Aware that this decision left open the "uncomfortable possibility" that plaintiffs, while lacking standing to sue under ERISA, may "be
preempted in state court under [Section] 514 from asserting a state claim,
leaving them with no remedy," the court did not consider that outcome a
concern of the federal judiciary, asserting that the "unavailability of a
149
remedy under ERISA is not germane to a preemption analysis.'
IV. ANALYSIS
Felix v. Lucent Technologies, Inc.150 is the latest decision in a trilogy of Tenth Circuit opinions that reject the "but for" test for standing
under ERISA with regard to former employees fraudulently induced into
early retirement. 5 ' As a result, these former employees who lack standing to sue under ERISA Section 502(a) may find their state claims preempted under Section 514 conflict preemption, leaving them without any
remedy. 152 Having received benefits on termination, no longer employed, and without expectations of returning to covered employment,
early retirees do not qualify as participants under ERISA. By rejecting
the "but for" test for standing, they are precluded from filing a claim in
federal court, thereby requiring their case to be remanded back to state
court where they will be on a collision course with the broad sweep of
ERISA conflict preemption. The impact of these decisions leaves former
employees with no recourse in either federal or state court. The same
result could occur in an action based on diversity jurisdiction.' 53
A. Lack ofan ERISA Remedy Does Not Affect Conflict Preemptionat the
State Level
The Tenth Circuit acknowledges the plaintiffs lack of remedy as a
"valid concern," but not one for the federal judiciary. 154 This point of
view is consistent with its prior decisions in which the Tenth Circuit has
noted that "the unavailability of a remedy under ERISA is not germane
to preemption analysis."'155 Mitchell is a particularly bothersome opinion
in that it allows the wrongdoings of employers and plan administrators to
148. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1160.
149. Id. at 1162 (citing Cannon v. Group Health Serv. of Okla, Inc., 77 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th
Cir. 1996)).
150. 387 F.3d 1146 (10b Cir. 2005).
151.
See Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463, 466 (10th Cir. 1990); see Raymond v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 983 F.2d 1528-29 (10th Cir. 1993).
152. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1162 (noting that this opinion "leaves open the uncomfortable possibility that Plaintiffs may lack standing to sue under ERISA but will then be preempted in state court
under § 514 from asserting a state claim, leaving them with no remedy"); see Houdek v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 879 P.2d 417 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that plaintiff's state law fraud claims were
preempted for relating to an ERISA plan, leaving no remedy).
153.
See supra Part III.B.
154. Felix, 387 F.3d at 1162.
155. Id. (citing Cannon v. Group Health Serv. of Okla., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir.
1996)).
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go unchecked as long as the employee receives all of the lesser benefits
to which they were entitled when duped into early termination. While
courts are aware that their interpretation of the preemption clause "leaves
a gap in remedies within a statute intended to protect participants in56employee benefits plans," this lack of remedy did affect their analysis.1
The Tenth Circuit justified this harsh result with its interpretation of
congressional intent.' 57 The court notes that Congress intended the civil
enforcement mechanisms of ERISA "to be exclusive, and the 'policy
choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of
others under the federal scheme would be completely undermined if
ERISA-plan participants ...were free to obtain remedies under state law
that Congress rejected in ERISA. ' "' ' 58 Seemingly attempting to sugarcoat
the grim outcomes afforded by this decision, the court points out that this
lack of a remedy is not as bad as it may initially appear.159 In some factual situations, plaintiffs may be able to bring a cause of action under
other subsections of 502(a) that are not of issue in the instant case; for
example, cases regarding a breach of a fiduciary duty, or claims for equitable relief under the catch all provision of 502(a)(3). 160 However, with
Felix, it appears that the court is unwilling to "second-guess" Congress'
policy decisions, even in light of the harsh
outcome or in the threat of
6
preemption of the plaintiffs state claims.1 '
In Cannon v. Group Health Serv. of Okla., Inc.,162 a holding consistent with its earlier decisions, the Tenth Circuit was not persuaded that
ERISA should not be allowed to preempt state causes of action if no alternative remedy is available. 63 Recognizing that this is an issue of first
impression, the Cannon court noted that no case law supports the idea
that "an exception to ERISA's express preemption clause exists when
ERISA provides no remedy."' 64 Once again asserting a refusal to rewrite
ERISA, the court noted that although the Supreme Court has not ad156.
Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir. 1992) ("While we are
not unmindful of the fact that our interpretation of the preemption clause leaves a gap in remedies
within a statute intended to protect participants in employee benefits plans, the lack of an ERISA
remedy does not effect preemption analysis").
157.
Felix, 387 F.3d at 1162.
158.
Id.at 1162-63 (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)).
159.
The court in Raymond stated that an argument could "certainly be made that the fraud
claims plaintiffs have made in this case are such 'laws of general applicability' thus falling within
the recognized exception to ERISA preemption. Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp., 983 F.2d 1528, 1538
n.14 (10th Cir. 1993). However, upon remand the Colorado Court of Appeals held the fraud claims
preempted by ERISA, leaving the former employees without a remedy. Houdek v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
879 P.2d 417, 421 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
160.
Felix, 387 F.3d at 1163.
161.
Id. (refusing to second-guess Congress' policy choices and holding Plaintiffs are not
participants within the scope of 502(a)(1)).
162.
77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 1996).
163.
Cannon, 77 F.3d at 1272.
164.
Id.at 1274 (noting that this is a case of first impression about whether ERISA may preemption state common law claims if no alternative remedy is available under ERISA; however, this
fact had no bearing on the court's analysis of preemption).
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dressed this issue, the Tenth Circuit has - the fact that a state law claim
may be preempted does not "necessarily mandate that there be an ERISA
remedy."' 165 Furthermore, the "proper focus for preemption analysis
should be on the nature of the claim for relief, not whether a particular
plaintiff has a potential remedy under ERISA."' 66 Finally, the Tenth
Circuit insisted that "Congress, and
not this court, is the appropriate fo' 67
rum for such policy arguments."'
B. "Uncomfortable" Possibilities:Wronged Plaintiffs Left Without
Remedies
Other jurisdictions have held that ERISA preempts state law claims
even if the plaintiff is left without a remedy. 168 One court noted that a
lack of remedy does not preclude ERISA application and "ERISA pre' 69
empts state law claims even if the plaintiff is left without a remedy."'
This line ofjudicial opinions paves the way for particularly bleak results.
In a dissenting opinion in Sanson v. General Motors Corp.170 Judge
Birch argued the case represented the "point at which the preemption tide
should be stayed.' 171 Judge Birch acknowledged that the Sanson opinion
"favors a finding of preemption,"'' 72 but was troubled by the contradiction between the underlying purpose of ERISA, to protect employees and
beneficiaries and the decisions that are being implemented by the
17 3
courts.
He stated, "A finding of preemption in this case not only fails
to further any such protective policy, it conceivably offers an unscrupulous employer a method of avoiding employee benefit 'burdens' ....and
stands the entire statutory scheme on its proverbial head.' 74 Perhaps
verbalizing the thoughts of many other judges, Judge Birch noted that he
finds it "difficult to comprehend, in a common sense way, how a law
enacted to protect the very class of individual into which the appellant
' 75
squarely fits can be construed to deny him such a preexisting remedy."'
This judicial construction is "disappointingly pernicious to the very goals

165. Id.; see Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1333 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The
lack of an ERISA remedy does not affect a pre-emption analysis."); see Cromwell v. Equicor HCA
Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1276 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Nor is it relevant to an analysis of the scope of federal
preemption that appellants may be left without a remedy."); see Hospice of Metro Denver, Inc., v.
Group Health Ins., 944 F.2d 752, 755 (10th Cir. 1991) ("We are aware that preemption normally is
not dependent on the availability of ERISA remedies.").
166.
Cannon, 77 F.3d at 1275.
167. Id.at 1274.
168. See Zanglein, supra note 37, at 673.
169. Id.(citing Dockter v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 91-56029, 1993 WL 55150, at *2 (9th Cir.
March 3, 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 310 (1993)).
170. 966 F.2d 618 (1lth Cir. 1992).
171. Sanson, 966 F.2d at 623 (Birch, J., dissenting).
172.
Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.at 623 n.2.
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and desires that motivated" what Congress set out to accomplish in the
first place. 176
Another case with a harsh outcome is Olson v. General Dynamics
Corp.177 Here, the Ninth Circuit found that because the Supreme Court
has interpreted ERISA's preemption provision so broadly, it was "difficult to see how Olson's fraud claim could be found not to 'relate to' an
employee benefit plan."'' 78 In his concurrence, Judge Reinhardt noted
Olson is left without a remedy.
that: "[b]ecause of the passage of ERISA,
179
Unfortunately his fate is not unique."'
In Aetna Health Inc., v. Davila,180 acknowledging that the Court's
decision was consistent with governing case law, Justice Ginsburg joined
the decision of the Court, but at the same time joined the "'judicial chorus urging that Congress and [this] Court revisit what is an unjust and
increasingly tangled ERISA regime."",181 Noting that plaintiffs "adversely affected by ERISA-proscribed wrongdoing cannot gain makewhole relief,"' 82 Justice Ginsburg, appealed to Congress for "fresh consideration" of the availability of damages and remedies under ERISA." 3
As illustrated above, the ERISA statute, initially designed to safeguard employee retirement benefit plans, has, "all too frequently, been
used to deprive employees of rights they previously enjoyed under state
law . . ,,184 Allowing employers to engage in outright fraud without
legal consequences - so long as the former employees received all benefits that had vested by the time of their departure, it is of no moment that
they were told a lie to get them to retire early mocks that purpose.
C. The Former Employee FraudCases Present a Conflict Ripefor Supreme Court Resolution
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of whether the
"but for" test for standing will afford former employees participant
standing under ERISA. Whether the Supreme Court will side with the

Acker, supra note 5, at 285 (citing Sanson, 966 F.2d at 625 (Birch, J., dissenting)).
176.
177.
960 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991).
178.
Olson v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 960 F.2d 1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991).
179.
Id. at 1423 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
180.
542 U.S. 200 (2004).
Davila, 542 U.S. at 222. (quoting Difelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453
181.
(3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring)) (alteration in original).
182. Id. (noting a "regulatory vacuum" exists where "virtually all state law remedies are preempted ").

183.
Id. at 223. "[The] 'gaping wound' caused by the breadth of preemption and limited remedies under ERISA, as interpreted by this Court, will not be healed until the Court 'start[s] over' or
Congress 'wipe[s] the slate clean."' Id. (quoting Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 106, 107 (2nd Cir.
2003)). "The vital thing ... is that either Congress or the Court act quickly, because the current
situation is plainly untenable." Id (quoting Difelice, 346 F.3d at 467).
184.
Zanglein, supra note 37, at 713.
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majority or minority views depends on how it views its own Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Birch185 decision.
If the Court narrowly construes the definition of participant, as applied to former employees, to include only those with either a reasonable
expectation of returning to covered employment or a colorable claim to
vested benefits, the minority view will likely be validated.186 However, if
the Court adopts a more expansive concept of participation, former employees would8 not
be deprived of participant standing and status to sue
7
under ERISA.1
The Court has had the opportunity to interpret the definition of participant under ERISA in Firestone. The Court, in a sense, rejected the
"but for" test for standing by holding that one can only be a participant
under the definition provided by the statute, if she has a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment, or if she can show a colorable claim to vested benefits. 88 This would seem to exclude all former
employees, fraudulently induced into early retirement, that have received
their benefits, even though those benefits were results of misrepresentation.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Varity Corp. v. Howe' 89 addresses
former employees who claimed to be defrauded. 190 The Varity plaintiffs
were considered participants or beneficiaries under the plan and were
suing for equitable relief to redress a fiduciary violation. 19' At first
glance it looks like the Supreme Court might be amenable to a "but for"
test, however, this case is qualitatively different in several respects. The
principal differences are: (1) the plaintiffs were reinstated as participants
in their plan; (2) the plaintiffs had a colorable claim for vested benefits
because they did not receive the benefits promised; and (3) the plaintiffs
brought their cause92of action under ERISA Section 502(a)(3) for a breach
of fiduciary duty. 1
D. FindingJusticefor DefraudedEmployees
The plight of these fraud victims, stranded without a remedy, violates the basic principle: for every wrong there is a remedy. Current judicial opinions subvert the original purpose of ERISA - to protect employee rights and provide a uniform regulatory scheme for employee
185.

489 U.S. 101 (1989)

186.
187.

See Felix v. Lucent Techs., 387 F.3d 1146, 1159 (10th Cir. 2004).
Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 703 (1st Cir. 1994).

188.

Firestone,489 U.S. at 117.

189.
516 U.S. 489 (1996).
190.
Varity, 516 U.S. at 494 (noting that the district court found that Varity and Massey, acting
as ERISA fiduciaries had harmed the plan's beneficiaries through deliberate deception).
191.
Id. at 507 (noting that Varity concedes that plaintiffs are participants or beneficiaries).
192. Id. at 494-95 (noting the district court ordered Massey to reinstate its former employees
into its own plan); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2005).
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welfare and pension plans.1 93 It does not seem possible that by enacting
ERISA, Congress intended to allow a wrongdoer to profit from his
wrongdoing; however, this is precisely what is happening in the case 1of
94
many former employers fraudulently induced into early retirement.
This is a serious anomaly that demands
a solution and is "begging for
95
repair."'
judicial
or
congressional
1. Congressional Reform
The most direct paths through ERISA's preemption thicket would
be congressional amendments.' 96 Congress should narrow Section 514
preemption to allow state remedies where employer/plan administrator
wrongdoing is involved. There should be no preemption when an employer/plan administrator manipulates the plan, or misrepresents to its
employees the benefits that will or will not be available to them in the
future, thereby inducing employee reliance. Congress "must exempt from
ERISA's preemption provision unfair claims practices regulated by state
insurance law, tort claims of fraudulent misrepresentation, and tort
claims of197
negligence relating to the administration of an employee benefit plan."'
Additionally, Congress can rectify the lack of remedies available to
former employees by modifying ERISA to permit remedies under Section 502 in situations involving extra-contractual and punitive damages.' 98 This would allow former employees to recover the benefits they
would have been entitled to, had they not been lied to. Without these
modifications to ERISA, the wrongdoings of employers, plan administrators, and insurers will not be adequately deterred. 99
Many members of the judiciary are urging a congressional fix.
Judge Becker, in Difelice v. Aetna, ordered the clerk of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals to send his concurrence to the Solicitor of the Department of Labor, urging congressional reform of ERISA.2 °° Judge Becker
is concerned that ERISA's failure to change with the times has "rendered
it incapable of protecting employees;" therefore, Congress must act
193.
194.
195.
Circuit's
(2000).
196.

See Zanglein, supra note 37, at 713
See Id.
Robert Simpson, Note and Commentary, Another Trip into
the Great Swamp: The Seventh
Preemption of Illinois
Unclaimed Property Act under ERISA, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 227, 229
Jane D. Bailey, Tenth Circuit Survey: ERISA Preemption, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 473, 473

(1997) (stating "[a]ny court forced to enter the ERISA preemption thicket sets out on a treacherous
path.") (quoting Gonzales v. Prudential Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1990)).
197.
Zanglein, supra note 37, at 713.
198.

Id.at722.

199. Id.
200.
Shannon P. Duffy, Becker Calls on Congress, Justices to Fix ERISA, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 16, 2003, at I (noting Judge Becker sent his opinion to the Senate Committee
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, the House Committee on Education of the Workforce,
committee chairs, and the ranking members, chief majority counsel, and the minority counsel of both
Houses).
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without haste in attempting to "prevent further injustice.'
Judge
Becker acknowledges that ERISA included a detailed plan for its protection of pension plans; however, it has fallen short in its protection of welfare plans, particularly health insurance.2 °2 He notes that although welfare plans are subject to less regulation than pension plans, ERISA's pre20 3
emption provisions apply equally to both welfare and pension plans,
resulting in a complete bar from state law for many workers' claims that
relate to their health insurance. 204 Judge Becker finds it "unlikely that
Congress intentionally created this so-called 'regulatory vacuum,' in
which it displaced state-law
regulation of welfare benefit plans providing
20 5
no federal substitute.,

2. Judicial Redirection
The courts cannot rewrite ERISA, but they can examine congressional intent more closely. Allowing a fraud-feasor protection from
fraud is not a way to make benefits more widely available, and this is
surely not an original congressional intent.20 6 Congress originally intended that courts should adopt broad remedies to restore ERISA violations, while providing "'the full range of legal and equitable remedies
available in both state and federal courts ....

,,,207 A look at legislative

history shows that Congress intended federal courts "'to shape legal and
equitable remedies to fit the facts and circumstances of the cases before
them, even though
the remedies may not be specifically mentioned in
08
ERISA itself."'

2

Because of the lack of remedies available to plaintiffs, a growing
minority of courts have found an "insufficient relationship between the
claim and an ERISA plan to trigger preemption, thus leaving state law
remedies [intact]., 20 9 Additionally, some courts have even fashioned
common-law ERISA remedies that duplicate the preempted state law
2 10
remedy.
The Court needs to rethink its interpretation of ERISA's preemption
provisions, and could reconsider that its prior holdings all allow for the
possibility of recovering compensatory damages. 211 The Supreme Court
201.

Id. (discussing Judge Becker's concurrence in Difelice, 346 F.3d 442 (2003)).

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Zanglein, supra note 37, at 718
207. Id. (quoting H.R.REP. No. 93-533 (1974), as reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655).
208. Id. (quoting H.R. REP NO. 101-247,pt.1. (1989)).
209. Acker, supra note 5, at 290; see, e.g., Taoumajian v. Frailey, 135 F.3d 648, 656 (9th Cir.
1998); Forbus v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 30 F.3d 1402, 1407 (11 th Cir. 1994).
210.
Acker supra note 5, at 290; see Cisneros v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 134 F.3d 939
(9th Cir. 1998); Ingersoll Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
211.
Duffy, supra note 200 (discussing Judge Becker's concurrence in Difelice, 346 F.3d 442
(2003)).
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needs to take a more active role "in reconciling conflicts between the
by some
circuits and in filling in the congressionally
2 12 created interstices
jurisprudence.
logical
and
fair
consistent,
3. State Action
ERISA's Savings Clause exempts from conflict preemption those
213
state laws, whether statutory or decisional, that regulate insurance.
States can pass laws that regulate insurance without falling victim to
214
Additionally, state legislatures can pass laws that
ERISA preemption.
regulate insurance to make relief more widely available. "[B]ecause
most areas of insurance 'relate to' employee benefit plans in some way
and would fall under general ERISA preemption, the Insurance Savings
2 15
Clause was necessary to avoid preemption of all state insurance laws.',
This is not a new remedy but allows more rights by proscribing what
insurers can and can not do.216 State laws can provide that health insurance must provide a certain set of requirements.2 17 This can help make
ERISA less harsh.2 18 States should enact legislation to make the appellate process more hospitable for plaintiffs.
State insurance regulators have already taken action to impose policy changes and pass regulations that will allow claimants new rights.2 19
California recently announced that it would fine UnumProvident (the
nation's largest disability insurer) $8 million, require the company to
reopen more than 26,000 California cases, and that it alter its policies in
the state to provide for "greater consumer protections., 220 For example,
California plans to require UnumProvident to change its language in all
new California policies, and "force the company to remove limitations
on benefits for 'self reported' conditions such as migraine
,,221
headaches.
Without legislative reform at the federal or state level, Congress'
original intent to safeguard the rights of employees participating in
ERISA plans will be undermined, and in many cases, plaintiffs will be
left without a remedy. In addition, California will require Unum to re212. Acker, supra note 5, at 286; see Davila, 542 U.S.at 208 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
29 U.S.C.S. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2005) (stating in the Insurance Savings Clause that no part
213.
of ERISA "shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities"); see Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S.
329, 336 n.l (2003).
214. Matthew 0. Gatewood, The New Map: The Supreme Court's Guide to Curing Thirty
Years of Confusion in ERISA Savings ClauseAnalysis, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 643,648 (2005).

215.

Id. at 649.

See id.
216.
217.
Id. at 648.
See id.
218.
219.
See Peter G. Gosselin, State Fines Insurer, Orders Reforms in Disability Cases, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at AI.

220.

Id.

221.

Id.
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strict its usage of a twenty four-month limitation on benefits for "mental
and nervous conditions., 222 The California State Insurance Department
has stated that it will discuss these new requirements with other disability
action against those who refuse to
insurers and will "take regulatory
223
adopt the policy changes.
CONCLUSION

In rejecting the "but for" test for standing under ERISA in Felix v.
Lucent Technologies, Inc.,224 the Tenth Circuit allowed for what it
termed the "uncomfortable" possibility that former employees, defrauded
into leaving their jobs and without standing to sue under ERISA, will be
faced with loss of any remedy in state court by the expansive conflict
preemption of Section 514. As a consequence, the plan administrator or
employer may commit wrongdoings that will go unpunished in a court of
law. The majority of jurisdictions have avoided this unfair consequence
by allowing the "but for" test for standing under ERISA in situations
where a former employee is attempting to file suit.
An employee's decision to retire in the unforeseen presence of fraud
is not an informed decision and is a wrong that should be remedied in the
courts. The lack of remedy in these types of situations is ironic; ERISA
was designed to shield participant's rights, but has instead become the
employer's sword, destroying all rights regarding conduct that are
deemed to "relate to" an ERISA plan.22 5 ERISA was designed to protect
participants, not to provide immunity to those who would defraud
them.226

Alexa Roberts*

222. Id. (noting that UnumProvident had repeatedly been accused of wrongly categorizing
claimants as suffering from such conditions to reduce what it must pay them).
223. Id. ("What we are saying to any company operating in this area of insurance ... is it has
to stop screwing people").
224.
387 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2005).
225.
President Ford summed up ERISA when he signed it into law on Labor Day 1974, "This
legislation will alleviate the fears and the anxiety of people who are on the production lines or in the
mines or elsewhere, in that they now know that their investment in private pension funds will be
better protected." Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, The Broken Promise, TIME, Oct. 31, 2005,
at 32, 42.
226. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1329, 1333 (5th Cir. 1992).
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